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CHAPTER THREE 
TIBETAN DIASPORA IN THE SHADOW 
OF THE SELF-IMMOLATION CRISIS: 
CONSEQUENCES OF COLONIALISM 
ROBERT D. SLOANE* 
 
 
 
Self-immolation is a reclamation of sovereignty over one’s own self within 
a state of siege. Biological life is taken in an assertion of political life. It is 
this possibility that is terrifying to the state in its quest to stabilize 
territorial sovereignty. 
—Emily T. Yeh1 
I. 
From February 27, 2009, to date (at the time of this writing, July 17, 
2013), in at least 120 confirmed cases,2 Tibetans living in areas 
incorporated into the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”)3 have set 
themselves on fire.4 The media has referred to these tragic acts as self-
immolation. Their pace has increased exponentially in recent years and 
months. In November 2012 alone, twenty-eight Tibetans self-immolated.5 
Contrary to common belief, self-immolation does not literally mean 
suicide by fire, which is more precisely denoted by the word auto-
cremation. Rather, self-immolation literally means “offering of oneself as 
a sacrifice,” particularly in the service of an ideal or deeply held belief.6 It 
originates in “the Latin ‘molare,’ meaning to make a sacrifice of grain.”7 
For Tibet, its etymological origin may be significant. It indicates perhaps 
the quintessential reason, so far as it may reliably be ascertained despite 
PRC censorship and other barriers to primary research,8 that many 
Tibetans have recently decided to set themselves on fire. It is an act of 
profound dissent and protest, among other sentiments.9 
Self-immolation is a comparatively recent phenomenon among both 
Tibetans within Tibet and, to a lesser extent, those residing in exile.10 But 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2320001 
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for many years (since roughly 1959), and to date, Tibetans have expressed 
their rejection of Chinese rule in a less drastic way, namely, by fleeing 
occupied Tibet. At great personal risk, Tibetans of all ages—from young 
school children to the elderly—flee Tibet each year and seek refuge in 
India, Nepal, and (rarely) elsewhere, even though they thereby generally 
condemn themselves to statelessness, poverty, and permanent separation 
from family and friends, among other tragic consequences. For most of the 
past two and a half decades, between 2,500 and 3,500 Tibetans have fled 
Tibet annually. The exodus of Tibetans persists to this day despite the 
natural perils of a journey over the Himalayas and the political, especially 
security, perils of apprehension by Chinese police, military forces, and 
border patrols, which can lead to torture, detention, and, in extreme cases, 
extrajudicial killing. With a native Tibetan population of just 6 million, 
and in view of the risks involved, these numbers speak volumes. After a 
new wave of protests swept across Tibet in 2008, China intensified its 
chokehold over the region. It also—diplomatically, economically, and 
otherwise—coerced Nepal and India to adopt harsh policies that further 
discourage Tibetans from seeking greater freedoms in these states. The 
upshot, according to recent estimates, is that the number of Tibetans who 
manage to flee China annually has declined dramatically.  
After more than fifty years, however, an estimated 150,000 Tibetans 
live in exile. In colloquial terms, their situation is one of the most enduring 
among the world’s unresolved refugee crises—colloquial because few 
Tibetans in exile enjoy any, still less refugee, status under national or 
international law, including aid or protection from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees. Most reside in scattered settlements, 
some quite remote, in India and Nepal (approximately 125,000 and 
25,000, respectively). Smaller communities exist in the United States, 
Canada, Switzerland, and a few other states. Neither India nor Nepal is a 
party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol.11 In part as a 
consequence, neither state recognizes refugees as such under its law or 
affords them comparable legal status. It would therefore be more accurate 
to characterize the roughly 150,000 Tibetans in exile as stateless.12 
The reason for the Tibetan crisis of statelessness is not complicated: for 
the reasons detailed below, their true state of nationality has been under 
belligerent occupation for more than sixty years, since the People’s 
Liberation Army (“PLA”) invaded Tibet in 1950. One year later, China 
purported formally to annex and incorporate it into the PRC. Stateless 
Tibetans, in short, lack a state to which to return. Until internal political 
changes in China proper make negotiations over, at a minimum, a genuine 
autonomous arrangement for the Tibetan people plausible, there can be no 
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resolution to the Tibetan refugee, or statelessness, crisis. 
The tragic, and tragically neglected,13 wave of self-immolations in 
Tibet in the past few years and the longstanding Tibetan refugee crisis 
share a common origin in China’s colonization of Tibet. Since Tibet’s 
occupation, China has treated the Tibetan people exactly as colonizer 
treats colonized.14 Hence both the refugee crisis and the more recent self-
immolation crisis represent sociopolitical and psychological consequences 
arising from the same colonial dynamic. By saying this, I mean to cast 
doubt on the predominant view, even among largely sympathetic scholars, 
activists, and politicians in (mostly Western) liberal democracies: namely, 
that Tibet is just another minority region within China and that the human 
rights violations suffered by its people, however serious, originate in 
China’s generally inequitable treatment of its national minorities.15 The 
truth is that, legally, Tibet is a country, a nation-state, under longstanding 
belligerent occupation,16 and Tibetans qualify as a people, in every legal 
sense of the word, entitled under international law to exercise their right to 
self-determination—including the right to choose independence, associated 
statehood, or integration with another state.17 The same right has been 
afforded to most every other formerly colonized people in the postwar 
era.18 
Self-immolation is not just one more manifestation of political dissent 
in response to the denial of this right to self-determination; increasingly, it 
is the only available form of dissent possible in the police state in which 
Tibetans live. For an increasing number of Tibetans, it seems, self-
immolation is preferable to a life of colonial exploitation or a worthwhile 
sacrifice to express their dissent from and protest of more than half a 
century of foreign occupation, human rights violations, and international 
neglect. Without appreciating the colonial status and colonization of Tibet 
and its people, respectively, the phenomenon of self-immolation can be, as 
it has often been, misunderstood—ascribed, for example, to socioeconomic 
factors.19 The Tibetan refugee crisis, similarly, cannot be appreciated 
accurately apart from its colonial context. That crisis will persist, and 
Tibetans in exile will remain stateless, until the world recognizes the 
colonial status of their state and its belligerent occupation. In short, the 
same context that has led thousands of Tibetans to seek greater freedom 
outside their historic territory year after year has now led more than 120 
Tibetans to set themselves on fire. The self-immolation crisis, which is 
likely to persist, is therefore of a conceptual piece with the diaspora of 
Tibetans in exile—and unlikely to end until Tibet’s people enjoy their 
inalienable right to self-determination. 
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II. 
The Trusteeship Council, one of the six original organs established by 
the UN Charter, suspended its work in 1994 after the tiny territory of 
Palau became an associated state (with the United States).20 The Council 
deemed decolonization, the postwar process that dismantled Europe’s 
colonial empires, thereby quadrupling the number of states in the world in 
less than half a century, complete. The Council still exists, but has 
suspended its operations indefinitely, because it believes colonies do not. 
In legal fact, Tibet, a colony the size of Western Europe, or roughly one-
quarter the size of the United States, exists to this day. It is inhabited by 
about six million Tibetans but also, because of PRC tax breaks and similar 
economic incentives offered to Han settlers, by a greater number of Han 
who have migrated from China proper. Slowly but inexorably, these Han 
settlers (now estimated to constitute about 7.5 million, roughly 1.5 million 
more than the number of Tibetans) are overwhelming Tibet’s indigenous 
population, as they did in Inner Mongolia decades ago, where Mongols 
now make up less than 20% of the population. Because of Han migration, 
Tibetans have likewise become a minority in Tibet, strangers in their own 
land.  
As a contemporary colony, Tibet manifests the same morally repugnant 
characteristics as its predecessors and essentially the same dynamics that 
characterized the prewar colonies of European empires in Africa, Latin 
America, Asia, and elsewhere. These include brutal and discriminatory 
treatment of the colonized by the colonizer, theft and exploitation of the 
colony’s natural resources, and appropriation of its territory for the benefit 
of the colonizer. As a de jure and de facto colony, Tibetans should enjoy 
the rare legal entitlement to what the Canadian Supreme Court has referred 
to as external self-determination, including a right to secede from the PRC 
if they so choose in a free and fair referendum.21 
In 1945 (notably before Tibet’s invasion), Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter, to which China is an original party, established the prohibition on 
“the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state” as what many deem the foundational axiom of 
the law governing relations between states in the postwar era. For one 
thing, after the defeat of the Nazis, Europe could no longer avoid the 
centrifugal sociopolitical dynamics breaking apart its erstwhile colonial 
empires. States also recognized, finally, the injustice of both aggression 
and colonization, predominant features of the world public order since the 
conventional origin of the classical law of nations after the Peace of 
Westphalia. And although the First World War’s Allies largely reconfigured 
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rather than dismantled colonialism at the Versailles conference, the moral 
bankruptcy of the practice became increasingly evident in the interwar 
period. The old norm of political legitimacy, statehood, and sovereignty 
based on the crude measure of effective control, which finds its classic 
expression in the Tinoco arbitration,22 gave way to a theoretical 
entitlement to statehood based on the (at first, largely idealistic) Wilsonian 
principle of the self-determination of peoples.23 
The self-determination of peoples, since its intellectual inception in the 
Wilsonian era, has begged the question what makes one group, but not 
another, a people for purposes of the principle. Scholars and politicians 
alike have long recognized that not all self-identified peoples can, as a 
practical matter, enjoy a legal entitlement to statehood or independence. 
Consequently, as a rule, self-determination must be respected internally.24 
I do not propose in this regard to break new ground or, indeed, analyze 
this issue in any depth within the limits of this chapter. It suffices to 
observe that Tibetans qualify as a people under any of the criteria 
enunciated in the mainstream international legal discourse since as early as 
the Aaland Islands precedent of the League of Nations25 and, more 
recently, the influential decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in 
Reference re Secession of Québec.26  
In the first place, unlike most of the states established as a consequence 
of decolonization after World War II, Tibetans share more than a common 
history of colonization or simple residence within (often arbitrary) lines 
that were later codified in conformity with the questionable post-colonial 
norm of uti possidetis.27 As I have emphasized in past work, one persistent 
problem afflicting the debate over Tibet’s historical status and its 
relationship to China is that “the distinctly modern Western conception of 
the nation-state, with precise borders and a single centralized government, 
is probably inapposite to pre-twentieth century China and Tibet alike.”28 
But that is true for well over two-thirds of the nearly 200 states in 
existence as of 2013. Few, if any, of those states (and China is among 
them) have had their legitimacy or right to exist as a state questioned on 
that basis. Furthermore, Tibet, unlike a clear majority of the others, enjoys 
a genuine national history stretching back millennia, that is, a history of 
existence as a distinct polity (even before the Common Era) inhabited by a 
distinct people sharing a host of characteristics and common governance.  
From its origins in antiquity until the 1200s of the Common Era, it is, 
to the best of my knowledge and research, undisputed among historians 
that the nation of Tibet existed and enjoyed complete political 
independence. Indeed, even “Chinese court historians recognized that by 
the eighth century, Tibet had become the most powerful nation in Asia,” 
Chapter Three 
 
60
having “actually conquered several Chinese provinces.”29 In the ninth 
century, China and Tibet famously concluded a treaty, which provides in 
relevant part: 
 
Both Tibet and China shall keep the country and frontiers of which they 
are now in possession. The whole region to the east of that [demarcation] 
being the country of Great Tibet, from either side of that frontier there 
shall be no warfare, no hostile invasions, and no seizure of territory.30 
 
China’s historical claim to “own” Tibet, ironically, relies not on historical 
relations between China and Tibet inter se but on the political relationships 
between Tibet and two foreign (non-Chinese) dynasties that ruled China 
for centuries, namely, the Yuan (Mongol) (1271-1368) and the Qing 
(Manchu) (1644-1911) dynasties. During these periods, Tibet enjoyed 
more de facto political independence than China. Both the Mongols and 
the Manchus ruled China directly. In contrast, Tibet continued at all times 
to exercise most modern sovereign competences within the geopolitical 
and spiritual framework of the unique cho-yun (priest-patron) relationship 
that developed between Tibetan Buddhist leaders and first, the Mongol, 
and later, the Manchu emperors who conquered and governed China. In 
the interim, that is, during the reign of China’s native Ming dynasty (1368-
1644), the nation of Tibet enjoyed a cultural and political renaissance 
known as its “Second Kingdom.” At that time, it exercised even greater 
political autonomy, largely free “of both Mongol and Chinese control.”31  
 China finally overthrew the Manchus, which had long been weakened 
by European colonialism, among other forces, in 1911. Shortly thereafter, 
Tibet expelled the two Manchu ambans (diplomatic representatives)—the 
sole vestige of Manchu influence in Tibet—from Lhasa.32 Their role had 
at any rate been largely symbolic for decades, if not centuries, not a 
meaningful indicia of Qing sovereignty or control. On February 13, 1913, 
the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, recognizing that modernity compelled urgent 
changes (political, social, military, and economic) and appreciating, in 
particular, the need for Tibet to emerge from its isolation and clarify its 
national status, formally proclaimed Tibet’s independence as a sovereign 
state on the model of the European nation-state. Without detracting from 
its symbolic force, it bears emphasizing that this proclamation did not 
create, but rather described or confirmed, Tibet’s status as an independent 
polity under, inter alia, the formal criteria elaborated by the European law 
of nations that had come to dominate the world in the twentieth century. 
Historians, legal scholars, and international fact-finding studies have 
uniformly concluded that even if Tibet’s pre-twentieth century status were 
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genuinely debatable, it would nonetheless remain undisputed that between 
the collapse of the Manchu Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the PLA’s invasion 
of Tibet in 1950, Tibet enjoyed de jure and de facto independence, “the 
conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international law,”33 
that is, under the Montevideo or similar criteria.34 
 That leaves, as China’s sole claim to sovereignty over Tibet, 
arguments based on its invasion and belligerent occupation of Tibet in and 
since 1950. Contemporary international law, of course, invalidates the 
annexation of territory by aggression, rendering it null and without legal 
force or effect. In 1950, Tibet qualified as an independent state. The 
PLA’s aggression did not change that status. But almost before the ink 
dried on the UN Charter, China, despite having only recently expelled 
European and Japanese colonial powers from its own territory, ironically 
launched its own colonial adventure. In violation of Article 2(4) of the 
Charter, which prohibits the acquisition of territory by force against the 
“political independence of any state,” the PLA marched into Tibet after 
winning the Chinese civil war. Tibet had relied for centuries on its difficult 
terrain and unusual geographic isolation for protection against foreign 
domination. But twentieth-century technology and geopolitical change 
weakened, if not vitiated altogether, these defenses. And although Tibet 
theoretically retained, under the nascent law of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, an “inherent right”35 to self-defense, with a small army of poorly 
armed and technologically ill-equipped soldiers, it had no serious chance 
of defending itself against the battle-hardened and technologically superior 
(not to mention far more numerous) forces of the PLA. 
 Of course, China vehemently denies that Tibet has ever enjoyed 
independence; in its view, Tibet has always been part of China. But this is 
a manifest fiction. Every comprehensive scholarly study concludes to the 
contrary.36 Regardless, that is, even assuming the point were genuinely 
debatable rather than dogmatic (a product of longstanding, widespread, 
and effective propaganda by the PRC, both within China and abroad), a 
chief purpose of the UN Charter’s core norm in Article 2(4) is precisely to 
insist that debates of this sort henceforth be resolved peacefully, that is, by 
one of the pacific methods of dispute settlement set forth in Article 33, 
paragraph 1, of the Charter. Otherwise Article 2(4) would have changed 
little from the prewar baseline. After all, seldom, if ever, did states in the 
centuries before the Charter’s conclusion not justify their territorial wars 
and adventures, at least in part, by historical, cultural, religious, social, or 
legal claims, generally asserting that the invaded polity, for one or another 
such reasons, belonged to the invader. Saddam Hussein, for example, 
unsurprisingly did the same when he invaded Kuwait in 1990.  
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Together with Article 2(4), the principle of the self-determination of 
peoples theoretically established the consent of peoples, as expressed, if 
necessary, in free and fair referenda, as the postwar basis for sovereign 
legitimacy. But as China recognizes, any concession to the idea of a 
referendum on self-determination would lead to the immediate rejection of 
Chinese rule by the Tibetan people. So to this day, while China insists that 
the vast majority of Tibetans want to remain part of China, it refuses to 
consider letting Tibetans vote in a plebiscite that would establish the truth 
one way or the other. The reason is hardly recondite. 
 In retrospect, two historical contingencies facilitated Tibet’s rapid and, 
in international relations, largely unnoticed absorption by China. First, it is 
a sad irony that “the isolation Tibet’s government ha[d] self-consciously 
cultivated to shield Tibet from foreign domination proved the principal 
reason that Tibet found itself unable to achieve political recognition as a 
modern nation-state—and thus powerless to resist foreign domination by 
communist China.”37 Second, the Korean War broke out at the same time 
as China’s invasion of Tibet. On June 25, 1950, North Korea crossed the 
38th parallel, inaugurating the first of the hot wars that punctuated the 
Cold War, which would dominate international relations and global 
consciousness for the next forty years. Tibet is a casualty of that period. Its 
people, as one author aptly put it, remain orphans of the Cold War.38   
 Tibet’s government sent a cable to the United Nations on October 25, 
1950, pleading for international assistance to resist the PLA’s aggression. 
Perhaps a few years later in postwar history, that cable would have led to 
action, prompting some kind of collective self-defense or military 
resistance. At a later time it may have prompted an international force 
under UN auspices, a U.S.-led military intervention of the sort that 
repulsed North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, or a unilateral resistance 
by the United States such as its reaction to North Vietnam’s aggression 
against South Vietnam years later.39 As the Fourteenth Dalai Lama 
communicated to the nascent United Nations: 
 
The attention of the world is riveted on Korea, where aggression is being 
resisted by an international force. Similar happenings in remote Tibet are 
passing without notice . . . . We can assure you, Mr. Secretary-General, 
that Tibet will not go down without a fight, though there is little hope that 
a nation dedicated to peace will be able to resist the brutal effort of men 
trained to war, but we understand that the United Nations has decided to 
stop aggression whenever it takes place. The armed invasion of Tibet for 
the incorporation of Tibet in Communist China through sheer physical 
force is a clear case of aggression . . . . The problem is simple. The Chinese 
claim Tibet as a part of China. Tibetans feel that racially, culturally, and 
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geographically they are far apart from the Chinese. If the Chinese find the 
reactions of the Tibetans to their unnatural claim not acceptable, there are 
other civilized methods by which they could ascertain the views of the 
people of Tibet; or, should the issue be surely juridical, they are open to 
seek redress in an international court of law . . . .40 
 
More than half a century later, even young Tibetans who have never 
known an independent state of Tibet, and can hardly speak of it without 
fear, continue to feel—indeed, to know—as the cable puts it, “that racially, 
culturally, and geographically they are far apart from the Chinese.” This is 
so despite the best efforts of the PRC, which have involved intense 
propaganda, economic incentives to Tibetans and ordinary Han, who have 
been encouraged to resettle in Tibet, and chronic human rights violations 
along with brutal repression of the remotest hint of Tibetan nationalism.  
 The unique characteristics of the Tibetan people constitute a second, 
independent criterion on the basis of which Tibetans must be deemed a 
people under contemporary international law. China has insisted for years 
that Tibetans constitute one of its fifty-five “minority nationalities,” of 
which the Han allegedly constitute one, despite accounting for more than 
90% of China’s 1.3 billion residents. To those familiar with Chinese and 
Tibetan history, culture, sociology, or politics, the idea that Tibetans are a 
Chinese minority is preposterous. It will suffice to canvass a few of the 
most glaring distinctions between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples. 
 First, Tibetans speak their own language, which dates back millennia. 
It is not a dialect of Mandarin or Cantonese. It does not even bear an 
etymological relationship to the Chinese language group—unlike, for 
example, Japanese, which uses Chinese characters. Tibetan has its own 
alphabet and grammatical structure. In terms of etymology, linguists 
characterize it as part of the Tibeto-Burmese language group. The Tibetan 
language also does not contain a word for China that includes Tibet: In 
Tibetan, Bod refers to Tibet, while Gyanag means China. Only in the post-
occupation period have Tibetans come to use the term Zhonngguo for the 
PRC (that is, for China including Tibet). 
 Second, the vast majority of Tibetans adhere to an intricate, unique, 
and highly distinctive religious tradition. The form of Buddhism that 
evolved over centuries in Tibet differs doctrinally and culturally from both 
Indian variants and the predominant Chinese sect, that is, Chán (Zen in 
Japanese). At any rate, only a minority of Han practice Buddhism, a 
tradition that entered China from India in the fifth century of the Common 
Era. Confucian, Taoist, and other spiritual or cultural traditions have for 
most of Chinese history been much more widespread and dominant within 
Chinese civilization than Buddhism. They remain so today. Tibetan 
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Buddhism, in contrast, originated in the unique fusion of Indian Mahayana 
Buddhism and the indigenous Tibetan religion or spiritual tradition of 
Bonpo, which, like the Tibetan language, dates back millennia, culminating 
in the Vajrayana tradition that came to prevail in Tibet and Mongolia. 
 Third, Tibetans differ racially from Han. “Han Chinese” is a tautology; 
there are no non-Han Chinese in a racial, cultural, or ethnic sense. The 
characterization of some Chinese citizens as “Han Chinese” originated in 
the postwar era. It is part of the fiction created and perpetuated by the PRC 
to justify Chinese colonization of areas, including Tibet and East 
Turkestan, which China calls Xinjiang. China characterizes these regions 
as part of a greater China, the “Motherland,” not coincidentally, a project 
similar to (but more successful than) the effort of Slobodan Milosević and 
his allies to establish a “greater Serbia.” China’s policies towards Tibet 
reflect colonial motives, such as natural resource exploitation and the need 
for territory to accommodate China’s huge Han population—as well as, I 
think, misplaced national pride. For Tibet is no more part of a Chinese 
“Motherland” than France could rightfully be said to be part of a 
hypothetically reconstituted Roman Empire. Even today, not only do most 
Tibetans not regard themselves as Chinese, most Han do not regard 
Tibetans as Chinese. China’s elite has long considered China the literal 
and figurative center of civilization, the “Middle Kingdom.” Tibetans 
historically had been one of the foreign peoples that China characterized 
as barbarians beyond its civilization’s borders. The idea that Tibet is part 
of a Chinese “Motherland” is a twentieth-century invention. 
 Turning from history, culture, and sociology to law, yet another reason 
that has been proffered for Tibet’s supposed status as part of China is 
treaty relations. Preliminarily, it is worth noting that Tibet’s entry into 
numerous treaties with states including Nepal, India, Mongolia, the United 
Kingdom, and China in the first half of the twentieth century casts serious 
doubt on the assertion that China has always controlled Tibet’s foreign 
affairs.41 But the gravamen of this aspect of China’s claim today is that 
regardless of Tibet’s status historically, it became an inalienable part of 
China after the 17-Point Agreement of 1951.42 That treaty states in 
strikingly irredentist language that “the Tibetan people shall return to the 
big family of the motherland—the People’s Republic of China.”43 
Because, with few exceptions, only states can be parties to treaties,44 the 
very fact that China felt the need to ground its future relationship with the 
Tibetan people and their government on such a legal basis ironically 
implies, contrary to China’s position, that Tibet had indeed been a state 
before the 17-Point Agreement. Why, after all, had Tibet left “the big 
family of the motherland”? Why did it need to “return”? Surely the answer 
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cannot be, as China suggests, European colonialism. Only a literal handful 
of foreigners resided in Tibet before the Chinese invasion, and unlike 
China, no European state ever colonized Tibet. China nonetheless ascribes 
any Tibetan desire for independence or autonomy to foreign instigation, 
typically meaning Western states that allegedly want to “split” China. 
Again, the true wishes of Tibet’s people could be readily ascertained by a 
plebiscite. China unsurprisingly refuses to consider this simple expedient. 
 An irredeemable defect at any rate invalidates the 17-Point Agreement: 
the PRC imposed it on Tibet by violence, including coercion of both Tibet 
(by the threat of an invasion of Lhasa and other areas) and its government’s 
personal representatives (by the threat of violence against them if they 
refused to sign). Shortly after Tibet’s belligerent occupation in 1950, the 
Dalai Lama, facing few real choices, sent official Tibetan delegates to 
Beijing to “negotiate.” But “under duress that included both [threats of] 
personal violence and large-scale military retaliation against Tibet, [and] 
acting without the authority or approval of the Tibet government, [they] 
signed the so-called 17-Point Agreement.”45 The treaty is therefore “null 
and void ab initio”46 under the law of treaties. Even if it were valid 
initially, the PRC abrogated the 17-Point Agreement almost immediately 
after its signature and continuing to date. China materially breached the 
treaty by, among other violations, coercively modifying Tibet’s existing 
local government and imposing severe restrictions on the Tibetan people’s 
freedom to practice their religion.47  
 Yet another reason that the Tibetan people qualify legally as a people 
and merit self-determination is China’s history of persistent human rights 
violations in Tibet. These violations include not only violence against the 
person and restrictions on freedom of conscience and expression, but also 
complete refusal to allow Tibetans to exercise any form of internal self-
determination—including, even though China deems Tibetans a minority, 
the de minimis minority nationality rights enumerated in Article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). China 
denies to the Tibetan people the rights, among others, to freedoms of 
religion, speech, education, political participation, and economic or 
cultural autonomy. Nomads have recently been forcibly resettled and 
traditional, often historic, structures and homes in Lhasa demolished to 
make room for new Chinese construction. Serious civil and political rights 
violations include systematic torture, summary execution, and arbitrary 
detention, practices that have long been part of China’s response to any 
manifestation of Tibetan nationalism or dissent from Chinese rule.48 
China’s human rights violations continue to have grave consequences for 
the Tibetan people, most recently illustrated by its brutal crackdown on 
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widespread political demonstrations in 2008, and even more recently, by 
its callous response to the tragic wave of self-immolations in Tibet.  
For these reasons, as the Canadian Supreme Court suggested, Tibet’s 
people may well have an additional claim to external self-determination 
based on China’s persistent refusal to let them exercise internal self-
determination (sufficient autonomy, political, cultural, and otherwise, 
within the larger nation-state), in combination with the PRC’s severe and 
persistent human rights abuses49—a criterion intimated as early as the 
Aaland Islands precedent of the post-World War I era.50 The PRC has 
shown consistently that it will not allow Tibetans even the minimal rights 
afforded to “ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities” (let alone those 
afforded to peoples) by international law, including the minority rights 
guaranteed by Article 27 of the ICCPR, “the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”51  
 In sum, Tibetans qualify as a people who should be entitled under 
international law to external self-determination under any definition of the 
latter term that does not reduce this central legal concept of the postwar 
era to a largely empty slogan. Yet for decades, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, 
(until recently) Tibet’s political and spiritual leader, has not insisted on 
self-determination. He has not asked for the referendum on Tibet’s status 
to which his people remain legally entitled. His priority has been to secure 
meaningful cultural autonomy, an arrangement that would sacrifice 
political self-determination for the sake of preserving the Tibetan people’s 
rich cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and other heritage.52 Because this 
modest request, too, has been met with obstinate refusal and a steady and 
inexorable process of Sinicization, it should not be surprising that Tibet’s 
people today see few options except self-imposed exile, which perpetuates 
a crisis of statelessness, and more recently, self-immolation, a new 
response to what has rightly been described, colloquially even if not 
legally, as the cultural genocide of the Tibetan people. 
III. 
Predictably, China’s position on the self-immolations, consistent with 
its approach to any manifestation of dissent in Tibet, is to blame the Dalai 
Lama. This position is both implausible and ironic in the face of, among 
other developments, the Dalai Lama’s relinquishment of any claim to 
political authority and, for well over two decades before, his public and 
repeated affirmation that he seeks only greater cultural and religious 
autonomy for Tibetans. China’s position on the self-immolations is as 
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preposterous as it is tragic: that a nearly 80-year-old monk has managed to 
penetrate one of the most strictly controlled political societies in existence 
today in order to orchestrate a geographically widespread campaign of 
self-immolations from abroad in cooperation with Tibetan refugees and 
their foreign supporters. A representative article in the China Daily quotes 
Wang Chengxian, the deputy Communist Party Secretary of the Aba 
Tibetan and Qiang autonomous prefectures: “For the exiled 14th Dalai 
Lama and his [associates] in India, instigating self-immolation is just a 
means of realizing their political goal of splitting Tibet from China.”53 
Similarly, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said that “the 
Dalai Lama and his associates have been instigating Tibetan independence 
and creating ‘disturbances’ and that [he] and his associates ‘single-
handedly’ planned” one of the self-immolations.54 China has also 
characterized Tibetans who self-immolate as terrorists and enacted a new 
“public security offense” that subjects those who attempt it to criminal 
prosecution.55 
The PRC’s rhetoric, however divorced from reality and colored by its 
colonial agenda, betrays the true cause of the self-immolation crisis. 
Despite more than half a century of PRC effort—ranging from financial 
and social incentives, to censorship, to abduction of a six-year-old boy,56 
to “patriotic reeducation” sessions mandated for Tibet’s monasteries and 
nunneries, to chronic human rights violations against the person, including 
torture, arbitrary detention, extrajudicial executions, and other forms of 
political violence—the PRC cannot convince some six million Tibetans 
that they are a minority nationality of the Chinese people. Tibetans know 
that they are not Chinese. They know that Tibet is not part of China.57 
They maintain a cultural, historical, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and 
perhaps above all, national identity that differs from that of the 1.2 billion 
plus Han who populate China proper.  
Tibet is a sovereign state under illegal foreign occupation. It is the 
world’s largest colony.58 Only brute military force and the political and 
economic power of modern China today, combined with an intense 
propaganda campaign within China and abroad, obscure Tibet’s 
colonization. Until that status changes, until China allows the Tibetan 
people to exercise their right as a people to self-determination, no effort 
“to control Tibetan discontent by means of carrot and stick” will be 
availing.59 Hence the self-immolation crisis within Tibet casts considerable 
light on the unresolved refugee crisis without—where some 150,000 
Tibetans reside in exile, largely as stateless persons.60 Neither self-
immolations nor the Tibetan diaspora will cease until Tibet’s people 
receive the same right that every other formerly colonized people should 
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receive in the postwar era: self-determination. As the world’s largest 
remaining colony, Tibet’s right to external self-determination, including, if 
its people so choose, independence as a sovereign state, should be legally 
undisputed.61 
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